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The world financial meltdown of 2008 has shattered into pieces the sophisticated but 
conceptually hollow premise on which the framework of self-regulating markets had 
been built.  The dominance of this conceptual apparatus in recent decades has left, as its 
legacy, the worst global financial crisis since the Great Crash of 1929, the worst recession 
since the Second World War and a collapse of international trade.  As a result, the world 
is also experiencing a mounting social crisis, reflected in particular in escalating 
unemployment and underemployment, and significant reductions in the value of pension 
funds.  The developing world, which had been experiencing in recent years one of its best 
growth records in history, has also been dragged into the crisis. 
Financial crises are not new, and the growing financial market liberalization since 
the 1970s has led to a good number of them.  The United States itself has experienced 
three of them: the banking crisis generated by excessive lending to Latin America 
(usually not recognized as a U.S. banking crisis, as it was Latin America that at the end 
paid a heavy price—a “lost decade” of development), the savings and loan crisis of the 
late 1980s, and the current financial crisis.  It has also recorded major stock market 
crashes, such as Black Monday in October 1987 and the collapse of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) stocks in the early 2000s.  Many industrial countries 
have also undergone financial crises in recent decades—Japan being the most noteworthy 
case—and, of course, the developing world has experienced an unfortunate record 
number of them.  However, the depth of the current crisis and its worldwide systemic 
implications are unique, and present major policy and conceptual challenges. 
This book aims at looking at these challenges, with a particular emphasis on 
policy implication.  It is the outcome of a seminar organized in July 2008 by the Initiative 
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for Policy Dialogue of Columbia University and the Brooks Poverty Center of the 
University of Manchester, and part of a research project supported by the Ford 
Foundation.  At the time of the Manchester seminar, the crisis was well underway, but the 
financial meltdown that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 
2008 had not taken place, nor had the government and central bank activism in industrial 
countries that subsequently followed.  At that point, some, including many in the U.S. 
Administration, thought that the world had “turned a corner.”  But we were convinced 
even then that matters were likely to get worse, and that we should begin thinking more 
deeply about the causes of the crisis, what should be done in response, and what to do to 
prevent a recurrence.  The papers prepared for the initial conference have been 
significantly updated to reflect the events and policy decisions between the time of the 
conference and mid-Spring 2009. 
The book is divided into four parts.  The first one looks at the causes, magnitude, 
and broad policy implications of the U.S. financial crisis.  It underscores both the 
distinctive aspects of the current crisis, as well as the “universal constants” behind all 
crises that have also been reflected in the current one.  It also explores whether the 
current attempt at re-regulating finance (the third in the U.S. since the late 19th century) 
will be more capable of providing durable financial stability.  A final chapter in this 
section explores the macroeconomic response to the crisis as well as the management of 
foreclosures and the financial rescue packages.  
The second section focuses on regulatory reforms, both national and international.  
After taking a look at the broad principles that should underlie a new and more effective 
system of financial regulation, different authors look in detail at the mechanisms of 
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massive expansion of central bank liquidity, the broad principles for an effective financial 
regulation, specific key aspects of regulation relating to rating agencies and credit default 
swaps, and appropriate institutional frameworks. 
The third section focuses on developing economies, in a sense, the innocent 
victims of the current turmoil.  It first looks at the management of capital flows in Asia 
and afterwards at the lessons that can be drawn from the experience of a highly 
successful country, India.  It then explores recent changes in the global financial system 
and their effects on developing countries, through both the capacity to maintain 
competitive exchange rates and the accumulation of international reserves as a preventive 
device. 
The final section explores broader issues of international monetary reform, with 
particular emphasis and specific proposals on the reform of the global reserve system. 
Two parallel papers propose an entirely new system that would overcome the problems 
of the current dollar-based system by creating a global reserve currency.  It is an old 
idea—Keynes proposed a global reserve system some seventy five years ago—but as the 
March 2009 Report of the UN General Assembly Commission on Reforms of the 
International Monetary and Financial System has underscored, it is an idea whose time 
has come. 
Our book thus attempts to draw on our analysis of the current crisis to make a 
fairly comprehensive and ambitious set of policy proposals in the fields of national and 
global regulation, national macroeconomic management, and reform of the world 
monetary system.  At the time of sending the book to the press, debates on national and 
global policy responses were quite active, including on the initiatives launched by the 
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Group of Twenty (G-20) during their spring 2009 London meeting.  Some interesting 
initiatives have been put forth, such as the renewed issuance of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs), and steps towards better international regulation, with emphasis on both more 
comprehensive regulation and the adoption of the principle of counter-cyclicality.  
However, many concerns remained as to the adequacy of the fiscal stimulus throughout 
the world and the unsettled position of banks in industrial countries, but particularly in 
the United States.  We hope this book will contribute to the ongoing dialogue on a better 
design of policies that will replace the ones that have failed in the past. 
 
The U.S. Financial Crisis and Its Implications 
 
As highlighted by Stiglitz in Chapter 2, the global financial crisis is distinctive in its 
origins, its magnitude, and its consequences.  It examines the failures that led to the crisis 
and, in particular, the important role played by information and incentives problems.  On 
the basis of this diagnosis, the author provides recommendations on how to reform 
financial regulation to prevent future crises. 
The crisis provides a wonderful case study in the economics of information. 
Stiglitz illustrates how the models—those used explicitly by or implicit in the mind of 
both regulators and market participants—ignored the imperfections and asymmetries of 
information.  Since incentives mattered, distorted incentives at both the individual and 
organizational level led to distorted behavior.  These distorted incentives included 
executive compensation systems in banks, conflict of interest in rating agencies, 
problems caused by the repeal of Glass-Steagall, moral hazard, the use of complexity to 
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reduce competition and increase profit margins, as well as moral hazard problems created 
by securitization.  While financial markets had changed markedly since the Great 
Depression, some of the underlying problems giving rise to crises remain the same—
most notably excessive leverage. 
On the basis of this diagnosis of what went wrong, Stiglitz suggests some 
regulatory reforms that will reduce the frequency and depth of such occurrences in the 
future.  Regulatory reform is, however, not just a matter for the long-term.  This crisis is a 
crisis in confidence, and it is hard to restore confidence in the financial system if the 
incentives and constraints—which led to such disastrous outcomes—are not changed.  
The author lays out the principles of a good regulatory system.  It should improve 
incentives for market actors and regulators, have better and more transparent accounting 
frameworks, and provide for adequate, counter-cyclical capital requirements.  Stiglitz 
also calls for institutional innovations, such as a financial products safety commission—
to ensure the safety, efficacy, and appropriate use of new financial products—and a 
financial markets stability commission, to oversee the overall stability of financial 
markets—ideas that have since come to become widely accepted. 
The chapter by Caprio argues that many of the features of the crisis are 
disturbingly familiar: they reflect “universal constants” of financial market behavior, 
particularly incentive systems that are conducive to excessive risk-taking and lax 
oversight by markets and supervisors alike.  In the author’s view, one of the major 
mistakes that authorities made was putting their faith in a static set of rules, ignoring the 
dynamics of the regulatory game—that is, the fact that any static set of rules will end up 
inducing innovations designed to evade the same rules.   
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According to Caprio, the goal of regulation should be a financial system that takes 
prudent risks in supplying a large volume of useful financial services efficiently, to the 
broadest part of society, and with the least corruption.  A dynamic system has to have as 
many participants as possible, with the incentives to uncover new forms of risk-taking 
that would then compel supervisors to act.  Supervisors’ main job should be to require far 
greater information disclosure to the public and verify that it is not false or misleading.  
More comprehensive disclosure allows society to monitor supervisors and hold them 
accountable. 
A critical ingredient in regulation is how firms compensate risk takers.  The 
supervisory agency could give lower scores to firms that award more generous current 
compensation and high scores to those with a greater percentage deferred far out into the 
future.  Regulation can also improve incentives by exposing to the legal system those 
who take excessive risk managing other people’s money.  Money managers should be 
asked to exercise the highest degree of fiduciary responsibility in line with their 
published objectives, and could face lawsuits for improper conduct, subject to the 
interpretation of the courts.  The same legal liability that money managers face should be 
extended to those who rate firms, so raters should be compelled to publish more 
information about their ratings, and courts need to hold the principals of these firms liable 
for their pronouncements. 
The chapter by Kregel notes that the United States financial system is currently 
undergoing its third episode of major financial turmoil and response in the form of 
financial re-regulation.  The first was the creation of the national bank system in the 
1860s, the second was the New Deal legislation of the 1930s, and the third is that 
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currently under way.  The first two episodes produced similar responses and similar 
financial structures, and laid the basis for subsequent crises.  Given the similarity of the 
present crisis with the two previous experiences, there is, therefore, the risk that the 
solutions introduced will in fact lay the groundwork for the next crisis.  
Kregel emphasizes the fact that financial innovations have not only led to the co-
mingling of commercial and investment banking, but also to a series of new institutions 
(hedge and private equity funds) that have taken on both traditional investment as well as 
commercial banking functions, but without the regulation of either.  Some of the major 
implications of this are that there is no longer any precise relation between financial 
institutions and functions, and that regulated banks no longer are the primary source of 
system liquidity, and thus are no longer the major transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy.  This implies that any attempt to re-regulate the U.S. financial system must start 
from a decision to either re-impose this identity between institutions and functions, or to 
shift to a system based on functional regulation. 
One way to see this is that the United States is facing its third try at deciding 
between a segmented or a unified banking system.  Many European countries have had 
the latter for many years without the same experience of financial crisis.  What have they 
done that is different?  Germany provides a good example.  Germany rejected separation 
of commercial and investment banks after their 1930s banking crisis and maintained 
universal banking.  Regulators operate a system in which the bank’s balance sheet is 
effectively split into short-term commercial banking activities requiring short-term 
maturity matching, and capital market activities requiring long-term maturity matching.  
This is the equivalent of extending commercial bank regulation to investment banks, yet 
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recognizing that the regulations must differ.  Interesting lessons can be applied to U.S. 
regulation, recognizing, however, that these requirements have not sufficed to protect all 
German banks in the current crisis. 
Entering into a more detailed analysis of policy responses, Stiglitz lays out in 
Chapter 5 four of the key aspects:  monetary and fiscal policy, reducing the mortgage 
foreclosures, and financial sector restructuring.  Keynes long ago recognized that 
monetary policy is typically ineffective in a downturn.  He likened it to “pushing on a 
string.”  Interest rate reductions prevented a meltdown of the financial markets but were 
unable to reignite the economy.  The burden must therefore shift to fiscal policy. 
Given that the deficit soared over the past seven years, it is especially important, 
in the author’s view, that fiscal policy aim at as big a “bang for the buck” as possible.   
Increasing unemployment benefits rank high in this criterion; tax cuts rank low, other 
than for low income individuals.  Noting that the U.S. has one of the worst 
unemployment insurance systems among industrialized countries, strengthening it should 
be an important component of any American stimulus, not just because it is the right 
thing to do but because money received by the unemployed would be spent immediately 
and so would help the economy.  A second criterion is that the money should create an 
asset, to offset the increased debt associated with the stimulus package.  A third criterion 
is that any spending should be consistent with the country’s long-term vision.  Federal 
government support of R&D to reduce its dependence on oil is an example of what 
should be included.  Assisting the states and localities to make up for the shortfall in 
revenues and helping them address the striking inadequacies in infrastructure is another 
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example.  These investments, as well as those in education, would stimulate the economy 
in the short-run and promote growth in the long- run, far more than tax rebates would. 
A major challenge is how to save the homes of the hundreds of thousands of those 
who otherwise would lose their homes, and not bail out the lenders.  A novel proposal is 
a “homeowners’ chapter 11”—a speedy restructuring of liabilities of poorer homeowners, 
modeled on the kind of relief for corporations who cannot meet their debt obligations.   
Stiglitz argues that the downturn will be longer and deeper because of the failure 
of the Bush Administration to design a quick and effective response.  In his view, the 
Obama Administration finally came up with a stimulus package that might work—but it 
was too little, and had also design problems.  It came up with a mortgage restructuring 
program—but it too was too little, and not designed to address one of the key problems—
that of mortgages that were underwater.  But its real failure was its incapacity to come up 
with an effective program to restart lending.  It focused on the past, dealing with the 
“legacy” assets, rather than looking forward.  It may work, but as this book goes to press, 
it looks increasingly unlikely that this gamble will pay off—and the costs to the taxpayer 




The second part of the book focuses on a detailed analysis of regulatory reform. In the 
first chapter of this section, Turner examines the principles underlying central bank 
liquidity actions taken during the financial crisis.  The toolkit of central banks has 
expanded dramatically.  The author then poses some fundamental questions.  Which 
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measures should remain permanently in place?  How could some of the dangers in this 
expansion of the role of central banks in markets be addressed? 
A bigger toolkit seems always better, provided those using its potentially 
dangerous tools are fully cognizant of the attendant risks.  Only central banks can provide 
the assurances of liquidity often needed in a financial crisis.  In the extreme conditions 
prevailing in autumn 2008, it was natural that fighting the crisis received priority.  Before 
this crisis, nobody expected the scale of operations central banks would be drawn into—
and many of these operations will at some point have to be unwound.  A lot of these 
measures, however, will probably be permanent.  Turner suggests three areas where the 
changes decided on during this crisis are likely to endure: increased term financing, wider 
deposit arrangements at the central bank, and better cross border provision of liquidity. 
One danger, according to the author, is that highly visible central bank operations 
can distract attention from fundamental credit problems.  Public confidence in banks 
holding large volumes of bad assets can be restored only by some form of government 
guarantee or by the government taking such assets off banks’ balance sheets.  It took the 
virtual seizure of credit markets in September 2008 to convince most governments of the 
need for an overall strategy to address this issue. 
The international dimension of central bank policies has become essential because 
the largest banks are active in many jurisdictions.  Recent central bank swap 
arrangements to address foreign currency funding difficulties were a very concrete 
manifestation of international central bank cooperation and, according to Turner, should 
endure. 
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D’Arista and Griffith-Jones emphasize, in their chapter, the seeming contradiction 
that the more liberalized the financial system is, the greater the need for more effective 
regulation, to avoid massive and costly crises.  The chapter develops the two basic 
principles on which such future financial regulation should be based. 
The first principle is counter-cyclicality.  It aims at correcting the main 
manifestation of market failures in banking and financial markets: their boom-bust 
nature.  The key idea is that (forward-looking) provisions and/or capital required should 
increase as risks are incurred, that is when loans grow more, and fall when loans expand 
less.  The application of this principle in Spain and Portugal shows that it is possible to 
design simple rules to make it effective.  
The second principle is comprehensiveness.  For regulation to be efficient, the 
domain of the regulator should be the same as that of the market that is regulated.  In the 
United States, commercial banks represented before the crisis less than 25 percent of total 
financial assets; furthermore, only a part of commercial banking activity was properly 
regulated, with off-balance sheet activities largely excluded.  A system of regulation that 
focused only on parts of the banking industry and that regulated neither the rest of the 
banking system nor much of the rest of the financial system clearly did not work.  The 
application of the principle of comprehensiveness thus requires that minimum liquidity 
and solvency requirements be established in an equivalent way for all financial activities, 
instruments, and actors. 
Finally, D’Arista and Griffith-Jones agree with other authors in this volume that 
flawed incentives played a critical role in the crisis, and they propose modifying 
incentives for bankers and fund managers so these are compatible with more long-term 
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horizons for risk-taking.  This would break the current link to short-term profits, which 
encourages excessive short-term risk-taking and boom-bust behavior of financial 
markets.  An easy solution would provide that any bonus would be accumulated in an 
escrow account.  This could be cashed only after a period equivalent to an average full 
cycle of economic activity has taken place. 
Persaud provides in his chapter complementary analysis on the design of banking 
regulation and supervision in the light of the credit crisis.  In the author’s view, two 
fundamental flaws in financial regulation led to the biggest crisis of modern times.  The 
first was to put market evaluations of risk at the heart of financial regulation, through 
external ratings and risk measures derived from market prices.  The essential problem is 
that market prices may improperly evaluate risk in the presence of market failures.  The 
second flaw was to assume that common standards, such as value-accounting and risk 
measures, are good and that diversity is bad, thus underestimating the advantages 
different players have to assume different risks. 
Persaud proposes a model of banking regulation based on three pillars.  The first 
will replace the notion of “risk sensitivity” with the concept of risk capacity, based on 
mark-to-funding.  Independently of legal distinctions, regulation would focus on a 
capacity of different agents to absorb risks, on one hand, and on systemic risks, on the 
other.  Those institutions with short-term funding, which have little capacity to hold 
market and liquidity risk, would be subject to capital adequacy regime, based on short-
term measures of value and risk, mark-to-market accounting, and high standards of 
transparency.  This would be pro-cyclical, but it would be addressed explicitly by a 
counter-cyclical second pillar.  Those institutions with long-term funding liquidity (like a 
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traditional pension fund or endowment fund) would be exempt from the capital adequacy 
regime, but would adhere to a new “solvency regime” that allows institutions to use long-
term measures of valuation and risk in determining and reporting their solvency.  The 
quid pro quo of not being required to follow mark-to-market price and value systems is 
greater disclosure. 
The second pillar of regulation would entail putting the credit cycle back at the 
heart of the capital adequacy regime rather than as an afterthought.  Capital adequacy 
requirements should rise and fall with the overall growth in bank assets, with clear rules 
formulated perhaps in conjunction with the monetary authorities.  Like several other 
authors in this volume, he believes that this reform is essential. 
The third pillar would be about maximizing transparency where it will benefit 
investor protection, with the constraint of not reducing heterogeneity in the behavior of 
all market participants.  Indeed, the whole regulatory framework should seek to support 
the natural diversity in the financial system and should draw on the systemically 
beneficial role of risk absorbers—those that have a capacity to diversify risks across time. 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have been regarded as one of the villains of the 
current financial crisis.  Certainly they failed to predict the general downturn in U.S. 
housing prices, but so did almost everyone else.  Their high ratings allowed pension 
funds and others to provide money to the mortgage markets, though triple A rated 
securities consisting of pieces of subprime mortgages.  Not surprisingly, there have been 
calls for better regulated rating agencies. 
The chapter by Goodhart examines how, if at all, should credit rating agencies be 
regulated.  The author argues that most proposed regulation of CRAs is either useless or 
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likely to be counterproductive.  The CRAs were dragged into the broader regulatory 
framework (e.g., Basel II) against their wishes and, perhaps, as the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission has suggested, they should now be removed from this role.  Since 
CRAs are essentially forecasters, the author proposes a small, independent (but publicly 
funded) Credit Rating Agency Assessment Centre (CRAAC), paid by the industry, to 
provide a public evaluation of all the CRA forecasts. 
More specifically, Goodhart suggests that all CRAs should be required to provide 
confidential details of their ratings in a numerically quantified format to the proposed 
CRAAC.  This Centre would maintain ex post accountability of CRAs by comparing 
forecasts with outcomes and publish reports on comparative accuracy.  CRA forecasts 
should have two numerical dimensions: central tendency, and a measure of uncertainty 
(forecast confidence), the latter perhaps being supported with a modest pre-commitment 
penalty.  Conflicts of interest are an important concern.  This can be handled by 
appropriate adjustment of the payment mechanism and by requiring all products to be 
rated by two or more CRAs. 
One of the ways in which this crisis is different from all previous crises is the role 
played by new instruments, illustrated so forcefully by the bail-out of the American 
Insurance Group (AIG).  AIG had provided credit default swaps (CDS) to many other 
financial institutions, and if AIG failed, there was a worry of a bankruptcy cascade, as 
those to whom it had provided “insurance” might also fail. 
Based on the importance of CDS, Mehrling argues in his chapter that the current 
crisis is best seen as the first test of the new system of structured finance.  That test has 
revealed the crucial role played by credit insurance of various kinds, including CDS, for 
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supporting both valuation and liquidity of even the top tranches of structured finance 
products.  The various government interventions of the last year amount, in his view, to 
the public sector going into the credit insurance business in response to crisis—by either 
writing credit insurance or taking over insurance contracts written by others.  The author 
calls this the “Paulson-Bernanke CDS put”.  In his view, a basic lesson of the crisis is that 
the government must be in the credit insurance business in normal times as well. 
The problem with this form of intervention is that it is both too broad and too 
narrow, and both too temporary and too permanent.  It is too broad insofar as it provides 
a floor under the value of portfolios containing a very wide range of securities, and too 
narrow insofar as it is focused on portfolios held by particular market participants rather 
than on the markets themselves.  It is too temporary insofar as it envisions no continuing 
support for markets, and too permanent in that it envisions long-term government 
exposure to the referenced assets. 
The underlying problem according to Mehrling is that the Fed is operating on the 
securities themselves, rather than on the relevant swap—no doubt as a result of the fear of 
supporting swaps that do not arise from any real funding operation.  The author argues 
that there needs to be a recognition that swaps are here to stay, and need their own 
discount facility.  The key element of such a facility would be recognizing that the risk in 
the triple A tranches of credit and their derivatives is not diversifiable: it is systemic risk.  
It follows that government involvement in credit insurance should focus here.  It may be 
desirable to have a standing facility, with a rather wide bid-ask spread, thus making sure 
that insurance does not get too cheap, so facilitating an unsustainable credit expansion, 
but also that is does not get too expensive, so sparking a spiral in the other direction.  The 
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model, obviously, is the standing facility through which modern central banks provide 
liquidity to the money market. 
The final chapter, in this section, by Williams, attempts to analyze the national 
and international financial governance system, their strengths and weaknesses.  In the 
chapter, a number of issues are explored and a number of recommendations made.  The 
author does not call for a total revamp of the financial governance structure, but rather for 
a number of improvements, among them some dealing with the issue of legitimacy.  It is 
also important that, since some of these issues had been identified prior to the current 
difficulties, to ensure that systems and regulated entities accelerate their responses to the 
recommendations already available. 
In particular, Williams emphasizes that serious institutional gaps have emerged, 
with no international financial institution having a clear mandate to require remedial 
regulatory measures when risks arise, especially from large countries like the United 
States.  She argues for creating a multi-purpose regulatory oversight body.  This could be 
based on the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), but it would require global representation 
and clear authority.  A key issue to determine would be defining a body that could 
develop how FSF recommendations would be implemented, with the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) being a good candidate once its membership is 
broadened.  In contrast, she argues that, although the IMF may be well positioned to 
evaluate the feedback effects between financial system behavior, it is not clear that it is 
best positioned to set regulatory criteria.  At a national level, Williams emphasizes the 
need for adequate regulatory mandates and information to provide policy-makers with 
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enough tools to ensure financial stability, given increased inter-connection and 
internationalization of financial markets. 
 
The Crisis and the Developing World 
 
Focusing in the next part on the crisis and developing countries, the first chapter, by 
Akyüz, deals with the management of capital flows and financial vulnerability in Asia.  
There is a growing consensus that vulnerability of emerging markets to financial 
contagion and shocks depends in large part on how capital inflows are managed, since 
options are limited during sudden stops and reversals.  Vulnerabilities associated with 
surges in capital flows lie in four areas: (i) currency and maturity mismatches in private 
balance sheets, especially of financial institutions; (ii) credit, asset and investment 
bubbles; (iii) unsustainable currency appreciations and external deficits; and (iv) reliance 
on help and policy advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rather than self-
insurance against sudden stops and reversals of capital flows.  Crisis prevention should 
thus aim at preventing fragility in private balance sheets and external payments, checking 
financial and investment bubbles, and building adequate self-insurance against reversal of 
capital inflows. 
After a brief interruption, capital flows to emerging markets recovered strongly 
since the earlier 2000s, with Asia being among the main recipients.  Asian policy makers 
did not generally opt for tighter restrictions over capital inflows.  In fact, Asian capital 
accounts are invariably more open today than they were during the 1997 crisis.  Rather 
than applying tighter counter-cyclical restrictions over capital inflows, most countries in 
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the region chose to relax restrictions over resident outflows and to absorb excess supply 
of foreign exchange by intervention and reserve accumulation.  In this way, most of them 
successfully avoided unsustainable currency appreciations and accumulated substantial 
amounts of international reserves.  
However, the Asian emerging-market economies are now much more closely 
integrated into the international financial system than they were in the run-up to the 1997 
crisis.  Foreign presence in Asian markets has increased, as well as portfolio investment 
abroad by residents.  This has resulted in greater fragility of the domestic financial 
system by contributing to asset, credit and investment bubbles, and increased the 
susceptibility of the Asian economies to shocks and contagion from the current global 
financial turmoil.  The combination of asset deflation with sharp drops in exports and 
consequent retrenchment in investment can no doubt wreak havoc in the real economy.  
This explains why the slump in industrial production in Asia during the present crisis has 
been more significant and more rapid than in 1997-98.  
Therefore, in Akyüz’ view, Asia may have learned some of the wrong lessons 
from the last crisis.  It improved domestic regulation and transparency, strengthened 
external payments and accumulated large reserves.  But its greater integration into the 
global financial system has meant that Asia has been exposed to greater risk, with little 
direct gain from access to more capital.  More importantly, Asia allowed itself to be more 
integrated into the global financial system, without putting into place counter-cyclical 
regulatory mechanisms that would have provided protection against the vicissitudes of 
global financial markets.  In a sense, policies pursued over the past decade made Asia’s 
financial markets less vulnerable to the problems that afflicted the region a decade ago, 
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but perhaps more vulnerable to the kind of shock that confronted the global economy in 
2008. 
Given his experience as Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Reddy provides 
in his chapter a practitioner’s perspective.  The author highlights several broad issues 
which need to be kept in view while considering changes in the regulatory structures of 
developing economies.  During a crisis, whatever has to be done must be done promptly, 
comprehensively, and effectively to bring stability.  But in rewriting regulatory 
structures, some broader issues need to be considered.  Most developing economies 
recognize the continuing need for reforms in their financial sectors.  However, the crisis 
of 2008 raises doubts as to the efficacy of known and existing models of financial sectors 
in the advanced economies, particularly the Anglo Saxon one.  Thus, in the future, 
reforms in the financial sector may have to be cognizant of the evolving understanding of 
the subject, and hence gradualism commends itself. 
In light of the recent experience with what may be termed as “excessive 
financialization of economies,” the author poses several questions: should there be a 
review of the sequencing and pacing of reforms in the financial sector relative to the 
fiscal and the real sectors in developing economies?  In view of the observed volatility in 
capital flows and of commodity prices, how should the policies relating to financial 
sector in the developing economies provide cushions against such shocks?  Reddy argues 
that the case for harmonized counter-cyclical policies (monetary, fiscal, and regulatory) 
in developing economies is stronger than for others, due to higher weight that needs to be 
accorded to stability.  Specifically, he argues for measures such as those taken by the 
Reserve Bank of India to limit asset bubbles, via requiring banks to increase risk weights, 
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make additional provisions, and impose quantitative limits on lending.  This protected 
banks against a serious downturn in asset prices. 
India also has developed institutional innovation by, for example, establishing 
within the Central Bank, a very effective Board for Financial Supervision.  Besides senior 
Central Bank officials, it has a number of eminent individuals, including from civil 
society and the corporate sector. 
Reddy also claims that financial inclusion should be at the center of any financial 
policy.  This means ensuring access to all the relevant financial services to all sections of 
the population, but this should not be equated with aggressive lending or simple provision 
of micro-credit with profit-motive driving the process.  In fact, experience with the 2008 
crisis shows that those banks with significant retail base tended to be more resilient. 
The remaining two chapters of this section represent also a bridge to some of the 
issues dealt with in the last part of the book.  Frenkel and Rapetti argue in their chapter 
that the emerging market economies found in the 2000s a new way to participate in the 
global financial markets.  In their view, one of the most important aspects was the 
stronger emphasis on the relationship between foreign saving, reserve accumulation, and 
the effect of competitive real exchange rates (RER) on economic growth.  The authors 
find major theoretical explanations and empirical support for the RER-growth link. 
The current global financial and economic crisis has brought back the discussion 
about the international financial architecture.  The emerging debate has so far focused on 
the degree of regulation of global financial markets and potential reforms of multilateral 
financial institutions.  These initiatives share the spirit of the proposals of the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, which were developed as a result of the crises in emerging markets 
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economies.  The proposals called for building institutions capable of preventing, 
managing, and compensating for the instability of the system.  This agenda is still valid 
today.  However, it should be broadened to take into account the lessons from the period 
2002-08. 
One important lesson underlines the key role of markets for developing countries’ 
exports.  The experience of financial globalization tells us that capital inflows and 
external savings are by no means substitutes for growth-cum-exports.  Therefore, 
together with institutional reforms aimed at stabilizing the workings of the global 
financial system, developing countries should also call for a deeper reform, intended to 
consolidate the positive features of the 2002-08 configuration.  For instance, they should 
pursue an international agreement on real exchange rates and exchange rate regimes that 
would lead to high growth rates. 
One objection to the proposal of targeting competitive RER, current account 
surplus, and foreign exchange reserves accumulation is that it implies a fallacy of 
composition.  Certainly, this kind of strategy cannot be followed by all countries at the 
same time.  However, Frenkel and Rapetti simply interpret empirical evidence as 
suggesting that developed countries can best contribute to poor countries’ development 
by providing markets for their (infant) products, instead of providing savings.  A situation 
like this would certainly call for international coordination, in order to reach an 
agreement on real exchange rate levels among developing and developed countries, and 
avoid fallacy of composition effects. 
The chapter by Carvalho explores, in turn, the accumulation of international 
reserves as a defensive strategy, as well as the reasons and limitations of their “self-
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insurance” function.  Conceptually, countries demand reserves of foreign currencies for a 
similar set of reasons to those which explain why individuals demand liquidity.  
However, while individuals hold liquid assets primarily to effect transactions, countries 
do it mostly for precautionary reasons.  Again, as in the case of individuals, the stronger 
the demand for money, the harder it is to obtain liquidity in public sources and money 
markets.  
The experience of emerging countries with balance of payments crises in the 
1990s taught them that liquidity can be impossible to obtain during a crisis.  The most 
important source, loans from the IMF, comes with a heavy price tag in the form of policy 
conditionalities.  Therefore, in the 2000s, many emerging countries accumulated reserves 
as a precaution against new balance of payments crises.  However, countries that 
accumulate reserves out of capital inflows are in a much more fragile position than those 
which obtain current account surpluses.  In fact, countries suffering current account 
deficits become more and more vulnerable to changes in market sentiment and capital 
flow reversals.  Besides, even when reserve accumulation is successful at making a 
country more secure, it may be deleterious to the international economy since money 
holding is fundamentally deflationary.  
In conclusion, the chapter notes that international liquidity provision remains as 
important now as it was in the recent past.  Carvalho argues that the best alternative 
would clearly be an international monetary system where a new international currency 
could be created according to global liquidity needs, as well as for emergency liquidity 
facilities to protect countries from adverse temporary external shocks.  Both were 
features of the original Keynes plan at Bretton Woods.  At a national level, Carvalho 
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argues that, if the world monetary system is not appropriately reformed, the main 
alternative to reserve accumulation is capital controls. 
 
Reforms of the global financial system 
 
The final section of the book includes two parallel contributions on the reform of the 
international monetary system, particularly the global reserve system. 
In the first of these chapters, Ocampo argues that the current global reserve 
system exhibits three fundamental flaws.  First, it shows the deflationary bias typical of 
any system in which all the burden of adjustment falls on deficit countries (the anti-
Keynesian bias).  Second, it is inherently unstable due to two distinct features: the use of 
a national currency as the major reserve asset (the Triffin dilemma) and the high demand 
for “self-protection” that developing countries face (the inequity-instability link).  The 
latter is related, in turn, to the mix of highly pro-cyclical capital flows and the absence of 
adequate supply of “collective insurance” to manage balance of payments crises, which 
generate a high demand for foreign exchange reserves by developing countries.  This 
implies, third, that the system is inequitable (the inequity bias), and that such inequities 
have grown as developing countries have accumulated large quantities of foreign 
exchange reserves. 
In his view, the major deficiencies in the current system can only be solved 
through an overhaul of the global reserve system.  The most viable is completing the 
transition that was launched in the 1960s with the creation of the Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs).  This implies putting a truly global fiduciary currency at the center of the system, 
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thus completing a trend towards fiduciary currencies that has been at the center of 
national and international monetary systems. 
Given the pro-cyclicality of finance towards developing countries, and the high 
demand for foreign exchange reserves that it generates, this has to be accompanied by 
reforms aimed at guaranteeing that SDR allocations are used to at least partly correct 
these problems, through either one or a mix of a series of alternatives.  One would be 
tying the counter-cyclical issues of SDRs with IMF financing during crises, thus 
improving the provision of collective insurance.  This means that SDRs that are not used 
by countries should be kept as deposits in (or lent to) the IMF, so that they can be used by 
the institution to lend to countries in need.  More ambitious alternatives would include an 
asymmetric issuance of SDRs, which would imply that all or a larger proportion of 
allocations be given to countries that have the highest demand for reserves—that is, 
developing countries—or designing other development links in SDR allocations—for 
instance, allowing the IMF to buy bonds from multilateral development banks.  A final 
alternative is to encourage the creation of regional reserve arrangements among 
developing countries that provide complementary forms of collective insurance. 
In the parallel chapter, Greenwald and Stiglitz argue that an ideal system of 
international payments should be characterized by stability and balance: stability in 
exchange rates and the absence of sudden crises, and balance in the sense that individual 
national economies should suffer neither from deflationary effects of chronic external 
deficits nor the distorting consequences of chronic external surpluses.  Both requirements 
are essential to the efficient international movement of goods and resources.  Yet neither 
requirement appears to have been met by the current dollar-based reserve currency 
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system.  Recurrent crises in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and chronic and 
growing U.S. payments deficits (with their associated deflationary impact) are 
longstanding characteristics of the current system. 
Looking at the global reserve system from the perspective of a global general 
equilibrium, they argue that the increase in the demand for reserves—understandable 
from the perspective of self-insurance, as discussed in the chapters by Carvalho and 
Ocampo—leads to a deficiency in global aggregate demand.  However, if some countries 
run surpluses, others must run trade deficits.  What has offset this in recent years is the 
U.S. spending beyond its means; in a sense the U.S. became the consumer of last resort—
but also the deficit of last resort.  This system is fundamentally unsustainable. 
The authors debunk the twin deficit theory of U.S. trade deficits—that fiscal 
deficits are associated with trade deficits—by showing that the U.S. ran trade deficits 
both when it had fiscal surpluses and when it had fiscal deficits.  They then argue that, if 
anything, trade deficits may cause fiscal deficits; the deficiency in aggregate demand 
caused by imports in excess of exports “forces” governments concerned about 
maintaining full employment to run fiscal deficits.  In this sense, the demand for reserves 
by developing countries generates an insufficiency of world aggregate demand that must 
be filled by a U.S. trade deficit. 
The authors argue that, without reform, these problems will continue to plague the 
global economy.  The current move towards a two (or three) currency reserve system 
could be even more unstable than the dollar reserve system, which they suggest is already 
fraying.  However, a simple set of institutional reforms which bear a striking similarity to 
those which Keynes cited in connection with the failure of the pre-Bretton- Woods 
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system would go a long way toward alleviating these difficulties.  They show how such a 
system could be designed not only to reduce incentives for countries to accumulate 
reserves but also to provide finance for needed global public goods.  The global system 
would be stable, more likely to remain near full employment, and more equitable. 
